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Abstract. There are many scenarios where we would like agents to report their
observations or expertise in a truthful way. Game-theoretic principles can be used
to provide incentives to do so. I survey several approaches to eliciting truthful in-
formation, in particular scoring rules, peer prediction methods and opinion polls,
and discuss possible applications.
1 INTRODUCTION
The internet has openedmany new possibilities for gathering information from large
numbers of individual agents. For example, people rate services in reputation forums,
they annotate maps with location information, and they answer questions in online fo-
rums. In the future, software agents will control networks of sensors and report mea-
surements such as air quality, radio spectrum, or traffic congestion.
An implicit assumption is that agents will make their best effort to report such in-
formation truthfully. However, when they are self-interested, this can not always be as-
sumed. For example, in online reputation forums, leaving a rating is a time-consuming
operation and most users will not do this unless they have a motive. Thus, one can often
observe skewed distributions of ratings that indicate that most reviews were left by users
who either loved or hated the item they rated ([Hu et al., 2006]). It is not clear whether
ranking items by taking averages of such reviews is very helpful. Similar, sensors may
save energy by providing inaccurate measurements or no measurements at all, or they
may be manipulated to provide skewed reports that are beneficial to the interests of their
owner.
To obtain better quality information, it is important to reward agents who contribute
ratings and thus increase participation of agents even without ulterior motives. Such
reward schemes could be useful both as incentives to human agents as well as for soft-
ware agents operating sensors: rewards could finance the operation of the sensors and
direct their deployment towards the most useful measurements ([Aberer et al., 2010]).
Furthermore, it is possible to scale the rewards so that they specifically reward truth-
ful reporting, and can even counter exterior incentives to report false information. These
mechanisms are based on scoring rules that reward correct prediction of a future out-
come once that outcome becomes known. In peer prediction methods, these rules are
extended to situations where the true outcome never becomes known. Instead, they take
the predictions of other agents as the ground truth to compare to. This makes truth-
fulness an equilibrium, i.e. the best response strategy when all other agents are also
truthful. Finally, I show how to design mechanisms that achieve this independently of
agent beliefs and are thus easier to apply in practice, for example for encouraging truth-
fulness in opinion polls.
2 Truthful Reporting Through Scoring Rules
In many cases, agents are asked to provide information about an outcome that will even-
tually become known with certainty. For example, experts may predict the weather, the
future of the economy, or the completion date of a project. When this is the case, incen-
tives for reporting this information truthfully can be provided through proper scoring
rules ([Savage, 1971]). Agents provide information in the form of a probability distri-
bution on different possible outcomes. Once the true outcome becomes known, they get
paid a reward that depends on how well their prediction matched the observed outcome.
This reward is computed by a scoring rule that takes the report and the true outcome
as arguments. A scoring rule is called proper if it provides the highest expected reward
exactly when the agent reports its probability distribution truthfully.
Assume that the task is to predict which of k outcomes o1, ..,ok will actually occur,
and that an expert agent has a probability distribution p= (p(o 1), .., p(ok)) for the true
outcome. The agent reports this distribution as q= (q1, ..,qk). We would like to provide
incentives so that it is optimal to report q= p.
This can be provided for example using the quadratic scoring rule:
pay(ot,q) = a+b
(
2qt −
k
∑
j=1
q2j
)
where ot is the outcome that actually occured and a is a non-negative and b a positive
constant. It is straightforward to show that this scoring rule is proper in that the expected
payment:
E[pay](q) =
k
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= a+b
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= a+b(2p ·q−|q|)
is maximized by maximizing p ·q, which is the case exactly when the vectors p and q
are aligned. Thus, reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for agents.
As an example, consider predicting whether the next day’s weather will be good (g)
or bad (b) as a vector of two probabilities (p(g),p(b)). Let the scoring rule be
pay(ot ,q) = 1+
(
2qt −
k
∑
j=1
q2j
)
An expert’s true belief could be that the weather will be good with probability 0.8, and
bad with probability 0.2. Now consider the expected payoff for reporting this distribu-
tion truthfully. If the weather turns out to be good, the expert receives a payment of
pay(g,(0.8,0.2)) = 1+ 2 · 0.8− 0.68 = 1.92; if it turns out to be bad, the payment is
pay(b,(0.8,0.2)) = 1+ 2 · 0.2− 0.68= 0.72. Thus, the expected payoff for truthfully
reporting the probability distribution is:
0.8pay(g,(0.8,0.2))+0.2pay(b,(0.8,0.2))= 1.68
Now consider a false report, for example (0.5,0.5). Now the reward in case of good
and bad weather is identical and equal to pay(g/b,(0.5,0.5)) = 1+2 ·0.5−0.5= 1.5,
and thus the expected payment is also equal to 1.5. This is significantly less than what
is expected for truthful reporting.
There are other proper scoring rules, such as the logarithmic scoring rule:
pay(ot ,q) = a+b lnqt
where ot is the outcome that actually occured and a is a non-negative and b a positive
constant. These may lead to lower expected payments or wider margins for truth-telling,
but can have other drawbacks. For example, with the logarithmic scoring rule payments
can become negative.
Proper scoring rules can also be constructed for eliciting averages and other prop-
erties of distributions. Recently, [Lambert and Shoham, 2009] have characterized the
questions to which truthful answers can be elicited using scoring rules.
3 The Peer Prediction Method
Proper scoring rules can be applied whenever the ground truth that is being observed
can eventually be verified. However, there are many cases where this condition is not
satisfied. Consider for example ratings reported for products and services on the inter-
net: it is not possible to independently verify whether these ratings were given truthfully.
Similarly, measurements taken by sensors would often not be verifiable by other means.
A similar situation exists when reporting opinions about hypothetical scenarios, such as
what would happen if interest rates were raised by different degrees: since only one of
these scenarios will actually be implemented, predictions about the others cannot be
verified.
However, in such cases it is still possible to make truthful reporting an equilibrium
strategy for agents by applying a proper scoring rule based on the prediction of another
agent, called a reference report. Provided the other agent made a truthful prediction
and both have the same knowledge and observing the same signals, truthful report-
ing is the best response. Thus, for a population of agents with the same knowledge,
reporting truthfully is a Nash equilibrium. This is called the peer prediction method
in ([Miller et al., 2005]).
As an example, consider reporting the quality of service received by a plumber.
Two agents A and B both report on the quality of service they received. The key idea
is that the quality of service A received will influence its expectation of the quality that
B received: if A observed good service, then its belief for the probability p(g|g) that
B also received good service is higher than the value p(g|b) if A received bad service.
Assume for this example that p(g|g) = 0.8 and p(g|b) = 0.4.
Now we apply the same scoring rule mechanism we mentioned earlier, but consider
B’s report the ground truth. If A observed good service, its probability distribution
for B’s report is (p(g|g), p(b|g)) = (0.8.0.2), and just like in the weather prediction
example it’s expected reward for the scoring rule:
pay(ot ,q) = 1+
(
2qt −
k
∑
j=1
q2j
)
is 1.68, provided that A’s probability distribution for B’s experience is indeed (0.8.0.2).
If A did not experience good service, it would expect B’s observation to follow a
different probability distribution, in this case (0.4,0.6). If it nevertheless reports good
service, the expected reward is only 0.4 · 1.92+ 0.6 · 0.72 = 1.2. On the other hand,
when A truthfully reports bad service, the mechanism treats this as a prediction of
the probability distribution (0.4,0.6) for B’s experience. The payments for truthfully
reporting bad service are calculated using the probabilities (0.4,0.6) and would lead to
a higher expected reward for truthful reporting of 0.4 · (1+2 ·0.4−0.52)+0.6 · (1+2 ·
0.6−0.52) = 1.52.
Note that, contrary to the weather prediction, we are not asking A to report this
probability distribution, but only whether it received good or bad service. Thus, the
designer of the reward scheme needs to know how an observation influences A’s beliefs
about the observations of another agent B with reasonable precision in order to compute
the payments. It can in part be deduced from the general expectations of the quality of
service, but also involves an assumption of how the individual agents would update their
beliefs in response to a positive or negative experience.
Furthermore, the original peer prediction method suffers from the weakness that
truthful reporting is not the only equilibrium strategy: any strategy where agents all
report the same is also a Nash equilibrium. In fact, since actual observations or predic-
tions are likely to be noisy, the highest-paying equilibrium is always one where agents
always report the same, independently of their true knowledge!
This problem can be overcome by constructing scoring rules that refer not to one,
but several reference reports. [Jurca and Faltings, 2007a,Jurca and Faltings, 2009] show
that when at least 3 reference reports are used, truthful reporting can be made the
highest-paying Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, they show that truthful reporting can
be made the only Nash equilibrium and thus completely eliminate the problem of col-
lusive reporting strategies.
It has recently been shown that peer prediction methods can be generalized to sce-
narios where agents report not on identical events, but events that are merely corre-
lated ([Witkowski, 2009]). This makes it applicable for example to measurements in
sensor networks, where different sensors measure quantities that are correlated by not
equal.
4 Opinion polls
A major weakness of the peer prediction method is that it requires all participating
agents to share the same probability distribution of the reported events. If this is not the
case, proper scoring rules can still be designed, but the rewards that must be paid to
agents quickly become very large ([Jurca and Faltings, 2007b]).
To counter this effect, it is possible to design peer prediction schemes as opinion
polls that publish the current results of the poll. Agents whose probability distribution
is sufficiently close to this published one will have truthful reporting as their best strat-
egy, while agents that consider the public distribution as grossly wrong may instead
be merely helpful by making reports that will drive the public poll closer to what they
consider to be the true distribution.
Such a mechanism was first shown in ([Jurca and Faltings, 2008]) for aggregating
opinions about a hidden signal that could be either good (g) or bad (b). At time t, the
published polls shows the average fraction Rt of good reports. An agent Ai has its own
probability distribution pi(r|s) that characterizes the conditional probability distribution
of a reference report r given its own observation s of the signal, where the reference
report is filed by another agent that observes the same signal and the same public poll.
The mechanism compares the report s filed by agent Ai to a reference report r filed by
another agent B, and rewards Ai if the two reports match:
– for matching a good report, the reward is c(1−Rt).
– for matching a bad report, the reward is cRt .
where c is a positive constant to scale the average reward, for example to ensure that it
compensates for the effort required to file it.
To analyze the incentives for agent Ai, we distinguish three cases:
a) Ai considers the current poll result reasonable, characterized by the fact that
pi(g|b)< Rt < pi(g|g).
b) Ai considers the poll result unreasonably high, characterized by the fact that R t ≥
pi(g|g), which means that no matter what Ai observes, it would always expect other
agents to observe a bad signal with a higher probability than the current poll result.
c) Ai considers the poll result unreasonably low, characterized by the fact that p i(g|b)≥
Rt , symmetrically on the other side.
In the case where the poll result is reasonable, the agent is best off reporting truthfully.
Consider the case where it observes a good signal, then the expected rewards are:
– for reporting good (truthful):
pi(g|g)c(1−Rt)> Rtc(1−Rt)
– for reporting bad (non truthful):
pi(b|g)cRt = (1− p(g|g))cRt < (1−Rt)cRt
Thus, the expected reward for reporting truthfully is strictly greater than the expected
reward for a non-truthful report. A symmetric analysis can be made for the case of a
bad observation.
As an example, consider that agents A and B both hire a plumber that according
to the public reputation scheme provides good service 90% of the time, based on 10
previous reports. Suppose that A sees the plumber at work and he does a good job.
Then A might consider that the current poll value is accurate or slightly too low and
report good service, expecting a payment of 10/9 with a probability of higher than 0.9,
so above 1 in expectation.
However, if the agent considers the poll unreasonably high, its best strategy is to
report bad, independently of its own observation. While this behavior is not truthful, it
can be considered helpful in that the agent drives the outcome of the poll closer to its
own opinion. For example, suppose A observes the plumber at work and realizes that
he is completely incompetent, but still by chance receives good service. Now, A might
have a private probability that B will receive bad service that is much higher than the
10% that would be expected from the poll, let’s say 50%. Now A would be better off
reporting poor service, as its expected reward would be 1/0.1 = 10 with probability
0.5, which is much higher than his expectation in case of truthful reporting. However,
the report could still be considered helpful in that it drives the value of the opinion poll
towards A’s true opinion.
The advantage of this mechanism is that agents can have different and unknown
prior distributions for the signal, whereas scoring rules require this distribution to be
known to the mechanism designer.
5 Applications
The techniques reported here have numerous applications. The most obvious ones are
forums such as reputation and review forums. Leaving such feedback is cumbersome
and thus often done by agents who have ulterior motives and thus do not leave honest
reports. Here is would be useful to reward raters for their effort, and it would be even
better to scale these payments to encourage honest feedback.
Another range of applications is in ensuring quality of crowdsourcing. For example,
consider an image labeling task as in the ESP game proposed in [von Ahn and Dabbish, 2004]:
two people are independently asked to give keywords that describe the content of an im-
age. They get a reward when they provide matching keywords. This game has the flaw
that people will tend to use very common words, and so these have to be explicitly
excluded. A more general strategy based on the opinion poll mechanism given above
would be to scale the rewards according to the frequency of the matching word: a less
common word would fetch a higher reward. One can imagine many other applications
in crowdsourcing where rewards depend on the agreement with other worker’s results.
Further applications can be found in sensor networks. The peer prediction method
can be generalized to settings where agents do not measure exactly the same signal.
It is sufficient that measurements are correlated in a known way ([Witkowski, 2009]).
Thus, one can design a reward scheme that rewards truthful operation of a network of
sensors that sense related values, for example air pollution ([Aberer et al., 2010]). This
could be applied in sensor networks, in particular when sensors are operated by different
entities who might save cost by inaccurate measurements, or even maliciously want to
manipulate measurements.
Services such as internet access, cloud computing, or wireless communications re-
quire monitoring of the quality of service. This would be most easily done by the cus-
tomers themselves, but the difficulty is that they often have an incentive to misreport
since they stand to gain refunds or other claims if service is deemed to be insufficient.
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that incentive mechanisms are entirely sufficient to
solve this problem, as shown in [Jurca et al., 2007]. Provided that the entire user pop-
ulation is sufficiently large, it would take a significant coalition of users to shift the
average reported quality enough to obtain a refund for poor service. However, as long
as such a large coalition has not formed, a reward scheme based on peer prediction is
sufficient to punish each individual user for deviating from truthful reporting, and can
be realized at low cost. Thus, a lying coalition would have to be created in a coordinated
fashion, and such coordinated action would be detectable by other means. This opens
another wide range of applications.
6 Conclusions
The internet has enabled wide distribution of user-contributed content whose correct-
ness cannot be verified. Much of this content is reported by agents with ulterior motives
and may often not reflect the truth. I have discussed ways of providing incentives to
agents to provide such content truthfully. I believe that such mechanisms are of fun-
damental importance for the future use of reputation forums, sensor nets and crowd-
sourcing applications on the internet. They also have other applications in multi-agent
systems, such as service monitoring.
While work so far has shown an interesting range of mechanisms to encourage
truthful reporting, many open questions remain. The biggest issue is clearly the depen-
dence on knowledge of prior probability distributions that are not always available. The
opinion poll mechanism we described is a first step but still has to be generalized to
elicit more complex information than just binary signals. Also, as it stands it has little
protection against collusive behavior.
Another issue is how to provide rewards. Paying monetary rewards is often not
practical, and one needs to experiment with other forms of rewards, such as reputation
or privileges that will be valued in similar ways as money.
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